PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As

MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.

BANKRUPTCY.

The fraud of a partner in so keeping the firm books, of
which he had sole charge, as to conceal withdrawals of
Partnership,
Fraudlent

Keeping

of Books

money by himself from his partner as well as
creditors, cannot be imputed to the innocent
partner to defeat his right to a discharge in

bankruptcy under the Bankrupt Act of 1898: U. S. District Court In re Schultz, 1O9 Fed. 264. If in any case,
says the court, fraud can be imputed to an innocent partner
on account of the fraud of his co-partner or other agent,
as respects the false or improper keeping of books, it can
only be in such cases where the fraudulent entries or omissions have reference to partnership transactions, so as to
fall within the general scope of the partner's or agent's authority.
BILLS AND NOTES.

The New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division,
Second Department) holds in FarRockaway Bank v. Smith,
7 N. Y. Supp. 518. that an agreement not to
Release,
Consideration

hold an indorser liable, to induce him to indorse

a note given in renewal of another note, which he had previously indorsed, is without consideration, as the performance of an act which is a party is already obligated to perform cannot constitute a consideration for a new contract.
Evidence that a month after a note became due an indorser paid the husband of the plaintiff, the holder, the inWalverof

terest on the note for one year, saying that it

was money he owed the plaintiff, is insufficient
to show a waiver of protest, and a continuance of his liability thereon, without proof of knowledge of the failure
to protest: N. Y. Supreme Court (Appellate Division,
Fourth Department) in Werr v. Kohles, 71 N. Y. Supp.
713. Two judges dissent.
Protest
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CHARITIES.

The U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals (First Circuit) holds
in Powers v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hospital, lO9,
Fed. 294, that the fact that a public hospital,
chartered as a charitable corporation, exacts or
receives a pecuniary consideration from a patient does not affect its character as a charitable institution
nor its rights or liabilities as such in relation to such patient;
and hence that where such patient is negligently treated he
cannot recover from the hospital, there being an implied
contract, the court says, that the corporation's shall not be
liable for the negligence of its servants in administering the
charity. The theory which denies recovery on the ground
that the charitable trust fund has not been set aside for this
use seems more satisfactory than the theory of an implied
contract to release from liability for negligence.
iabiity
for
Negigence

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

By a resolution of the trustees of the University of
Arkansas, the office of vice-director and pomologist of the
agricultural experiment station was created and
Obligation
of
A was elected thereto for a fixed term at a
Contract
specified salary. Before the term expired the
legislature passed an act which after detailing appropriations to the university, abolished this office, and prohibited
the allowance of any pay therefor. This act is upheld in
Vicenheller v. Reagan, 64 S. W. 278, by the Supreme Court
of Arkansas, on the ground that it did not impair the obligation of a contract, since, in the view of the court, the
rights, duties and obligations of the officer grew out of the
law and not out of the contract, and the legislature, unless
prohibited by the constitution, might amend or repeal the
law. The Chief Justice dissents.
In People ex rel. Fleishrnann v. Caldwell, 71 N. Y.
Supp. 654, the New York Supreme Court (Appellate DiTicket
vision, Fourth Department) holds unconstituBrokerage
tional a law providing that no person shall sell
a passage ticket giving any right to a passage or any railway train unless he is an authorized agent of the company
running such train, and has received a certificate of authority
therefor in writing from such company. Such act, the
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Continued).

court holds, conflicts with the "due process of law" clause
of the Constitution, since it deprives citizens of the liberty
of engaging in the legitimate business of ticket brokerage.
Nor is such act valid as a police regulation of the ticket
brokerage business, since in the view of the court, it does
not tend to promote the health, comfort or welfare of society, these being set as the boundaries of this rather indefinite power. The fact that certain frauds have resulted
from ticket brokerage does not, it is said, justify so rigorous

an act.
CONTRACTS.

A contract whereby a water company is to furnish from
its canal any surplus water not required for other purposes,
Mutuality,
Enforcement

without being required to keep its canal in repair, or to perform any labor, or to incur any

expense to carry out the contract, and the consumer, if the
water is furnished, is to pay for it at a stipulated rate, is
wanting in mutuality, and will not support an action to recover of the consumer on his failure to take water: Appellate Court of Indiana in Jordan v. Indianapolis Water
Co., 61 N. E. 12. The court refers to numerous authorities
which it summarizes by saying: "From the authorities to
which we have referred, the general rule may be deduced
that, in the absence of mutuality in a contract-i. e., where
the covenant is lacking in mutual binding covenants,-the
contract cannot be enforced.
A, doing business under the name of Committee on Distribution, through his agent obtained B's order for certain
Misrepresen.

books.

The agent falsely represented and in-

duced the defendant to believe that he was purchasing the books from a committee of the
United States Congress, that the books could be obtained
only on the recommendation of a Congressman and that he
had been recommended by the Congressman of his district.
The N. Y. Supreme Court (Appellate Division, Fourth
Department) with one judge dissenting, holds in Barcus v.
Dorries,71 N. Y. Supp. 695, that B was under no obligation
to take the books from A, even though they were in every
respect as good as represented.
tation,
Materiality
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COVENANTS.

In Bridgewater v. Ocean City R. Co., 49 Atl. 8oi, the
Court of Chancery of New Jersey holds that where a general scheme of land improvement is announced
to invited purchasers of lots, and part of the promulgated scheme is the declaration that a named portion of
the lands shall be devoted to special purposes which are
held out to be advantageous to all the lots to be sold, an
implied covenant is thereby entered into by the owner with
lot purchasers that the named portion shall be devoted to
the announced uses, though there is no written covenant in
their deeds. This implied covenant may be enforced by the
purchaser of his grantees against the vendor or such of his
grantees as purchased with notice of such covenant; so, too,
against a donee of the grantor.

DAMAGES.

In Wiest v. City of Philadelphia, 49 Atl. 891, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania holds that an expectation of
inheritance cannot be considered as an element
Death by
Wrongful
of damages to adult children from their father's
Act
death and should not be submitted to the jury.
The case further decides a point entirely different, but
worthy of note, that where the plaintiff in trespass to recover damages for negligence declares for a joint tort, and
the evidence shows no joint action by the defendants, a
judgment against one defendant for a separate tort cannot
be permitted.
In an action for injuries caused by the diversion of a
stream, evidence that the plaintiff, by a small expense in
Repairing
"riprapping" the bank of the new channel, could
lnjury
have avoided or diminished the damages to his
property, was admissible, it being his duty to use reasonable
care to save it from injury; Supreme Court of Montana in
Sweeney v. Montana Cent. Rv. Co., 65 Pac. 9l2. The
court discusses the authorities in regard to the active steps
which must be taken by a man to protect himself from the
consequences of the wrongful acts of others. "It is the duty
of a party to protect himself from the injurious consequences
of the wrongful act of another. if he can do so by ordinary
effort and care and at moderate expense," says the court, and
whether he could have done so in this case, it is said. should
have been left to the jury.
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PRATH BY WRONGFUT4 ACT.

A cause of action founded on a statute of one state,
conferring a right of action to recover damages for wrong,forc.m~nit

ful death, may be enforced in a court of the

United States sitting in another, when it is not
inconsjstent .yithi the statwutes or .pubie P.0Jey of
the state in which the action is brought: U. S, Circuit Court
of Appeals (Fifth Circuit) in Burrell v. Fleming, io9 Fed.
489.
In

Another State

DECIDErT'S ESTATVES.

The Pennsylvania rule that in actions founded on a note,
a copy of which shall have been filed at the time of filing the
AmIsslop of statement, the execution of the same shall be
Pz*mutIop
taken as admitted, unless the defendant shall
deny its execution on oath, does not apply to suits against
an executor on a note given by the decedent so held by the
State Supreme Court in Perkins v, Huntes, 49 Atl. 934.

D.EPOSIT BY PUBIQI

OFFICEPR

The Supreme Court of Nebraska, overruling a former
decision made in State v. Keim, 8 Neb. 63, holds in Farmers
etr. Co. v. Red Clogd, 87 N. W. 175, that when
Reovery by
Mniccpay

an officer charged with the collection and cus-

tody of public money unlawfully deposits the same in a bank
for safe-keeping, and the same is subject to check or demand
of such officer, the state, county or other municipal body
for whom such officer acted may maintain an action in its
own name to recover such deposit.

DIVORCE,

The well-known hesitation of the courts is granting divorces where there is a suspicion of collusion appears again
5,fficloenof

in Klowan v. Kloman, 49 Atl. 81o, where the

Court of Chancery of New Jersey holds that a
divorce will not be granted on the uncorroborated confessions of adultery by the defendant, through such confessions
are non-collusive.
RVIdr,,ee
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RPfUITY.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania holds in Keystone
etc. v. People's etc. Co., 49 Atl. 951, that a bill for the
Jurisdiction

recovery of possession of personal property will

not lie though there is alleged interference with
the exercise of corporate rights, this being merely incident
to and the result of the retention of the property by the defendant, and though such property is, as a rule, necessary
to the exercise of the franchises of a company like the plaintiff, it not being alleged that without the specific property in
dispute, it cannot exercise the powers and privileges conferred on it.
FEDERAL COURTS.

An orderly administration of the law requires that the
U. S. Circuit Courts should follow a decision of a Circuit
Stare
Court of Appeals of another circuit in the
Decisis
absence of conflicting authority and when the
question is presented on precisely the same state of facts:
U. S. Circuit Court (N. D. New York) in Hale v. Hilliker, lO9 Fed. 273.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE.

Where a conveyance of a husband's land by a husband
and wife was set aside as in fraud of creditors, the wife's
flortgage,
right to dower therein was subject to a ratable
Dower
contribution towards the payment of a mortgage on the premises executed by the grantee: N. Y. Supreme Court (Appelate Division, Fourth Department) in
McMahon v. Specht, 71 N. Y. Supp. 8o6. It was immaterial, says the court, as affecting such right of the mortgagee that the wife was not a party to set aside the conveyance.
-GIFT CAUSA MORTIS.

In a very able opinion in Sinnott v. Hibernia National
Bank, 30 Southern, 233, Chief Justice Nicholls, of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, reviews and comCivil Law
pares the common law and civil law rules as to
gifts causa imortis. It appears, he says, that the donation causa
mortis of the common law is but the donation inter inos es-
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GIFT CAUSA MORTIS (Continued).

tablished by our Code with the exception that the first was
not complete until the death of the donor, while the second
becomes effective at once. Without doubt the tendency of
the common law is in the same direction to require the same
formalities in the two kinds of gifts, retaining- the difference as to the time of taking effect. Of course certain distinctions outside of this still remain in some jurisdictions.

INSURANCE.

The application for insurance on a mill contained an
agreement by the insured "to keep a watchman on the premAgreements, ises at all times when not in operation," but the
Warranty
policy contained no express provision that failure to keep a watchman should make the policy void. Under
these circumstances the Supreme Court of Michigan holds
in McGamon v. Michigan Millers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 87
N. W. 61, that where the insured employed a reliable watchman, and charged him with the duty of watching the premises, the company was liable on the policy, though the
watchman may have been absent at the time of the fire, since
such agreement, in the opinion of the court, is not a warranty requiring a literal observance to keep the policy in
force. One judge dissents; Judge Grant dissents on the
ground that the application is a part of the contract and
that by it the statements were declared to be warranties.

JUDGMENT.

B recovered a judgment of $463.13 against A, and a
few days later A recovered a judgment of $200 against B.
A was insolvent, and had agreed to give his
Equitable
Assignment,

attorneys forty per cent of the judgment re-

covered in his favor. B sued to set off A's
entire judgment of $200 against a like sum of B's judgment.
Upon these facts the Supreme Court of Mississippi holds
in Harris v. Hazelhurst Oil-Mill and Mfg. Co., 30 Southern, 273. that there was an equitable assignment in praesenti of forty per cent of the judgment to A's attorneys, and
it was an error to grant the set-off for the full amount.
Set-of t
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LANDLORD AND TENANT.

The Suprme Court of Oregon, in Messinger v. Union
Warehouse Co., 6 5 Pac. 8o8, holds that where the owner
of land makes an agreement whereby another
Rent
Reserved
is to cultivate the same on shares, in the absence
In Kind
of any express words indicating a contrary intention, the owner impliedly reserves an interest in the crop,
which he may take without the occupier's consent. This practically amounts to holding that an agreement to cultivate land
on the shares does not constitute a lease in which the parties
sustain the relation of landlord and tenant, but that the occupier receives his share of the crop as wages. By itself
under this decision the occupier is not a tenant, but, as he
is called in Pennsylvania, a cropper. Something more is
necessary to establish the relation of landlord and tenant
and to cause the landlord's share to be properly designated
rent.
A landlord will be enjoined from cutting off power which
he was to furnish under a lease to a tenant in lawful possession, notwithstanding, differences have arisen
Injunction
between the parties as to the payment of rent:
N. Y. Supreme Court (Special term, New York County) in
Traitel Marble Co. v. Chase, 71 N. Y. Supp. 628.

MANDAMUS.

Where a telephone company refuses to supply all in similar circumstances with similar facilities, without discrimination, it may be compelled to do so by manTelephone
Companies,
damus: Supreme Court of South Carolina in
Discrimination

State ex rel. Gwynn v. Citizen's Telephone Co.,

39 S. E. 257, and this remedy the court holds available
and the company will be compelled to furnish the facilities
to the petitioner though the petitioner has not complied
with a previous contract with the respondent whereby he
agreed to use the respondent's telephone exclusively, the
remedy of the respondent being in an action for breach of the
contract and not in a refusal to furnish further facilities.
But it is a sufficient return to such writ of mandamus that
the respondent has not the means to comply at once with
the demand.
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MASTER AND SERVANT.

A manufacturer contracted with prison directors for a
certain building and the labor of convicts, who were to reConvict
main in the custody of the guards while enLabor
gaged in the work. The plaintiff, a convict,
was assigned to operate- an elevator, and while engaged at
his duty was injured. The Court of Appeals of Maryland
holds that the relation of master and servant so far existed
between such manufacturer and the plaintiff that the former was liable for any injury resulting from failure to exercise reasonable care in providing safe machinery: Baltimore Boot and Shoe Mfg. Co., of Baltimore City, v. Jamer,
49 Atl. 847. Referring to some cases holding that between
an employer of convict labor and the convicts the relation
of master and servant does not exist. the court says: The
legal principles applicable to such cases require that the contractor should be held to a master's liability to the convict
whose labor he uses, in respect to those incidents of employment over which he has the same measure of control that
a master ordinarily has, but not as to those features of the
employment over which he is essentially deprived of such
control.
NEGLIGENCE.

In Western and A. R. Co. v. Ferguson, 39 S. E. 306,
it is held by the Supreme Court of Georgia that failure to
Contributory exercise ordinary care on the part of a person
Negligence
injured before the negligence complained of is
apparent or should have been reasonably apprehended will
not preclude a recovery, but will authorize the jury to diminish the damages in proportion to the fault attributable
to the person injured.

NEW TRIAL.

It is apparently well settled that courts, as a rule, do not
grant new trials on newly-discovered evidence that is
Retraction by merely cumulative, or that simply tends to disProsecuting credit or impeach one or more of the witnesses
Witness
of the adverse party. But in Bussey v. State,
64 S. W. 268, the Supreme Court of Arkansas holds that
where the defendant's conviction for rape rested almost
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NEW TRIAL (Continued).

entirely on the testimony of the prosecuting witness, who
afterwards made a retraction under oath, it was error to
refuse a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence.
PARTITION.

A will provided that the testator's estate should be divided among her seven children equally with the exception
Power
of one, whose share should be reduced to a cerof Sale
tain amount, and the amount of the reduction
divided equally among the other children. It was provided
the children could agree on a division of the property, but if
they were unable to agree thereto voluntary, the executor's
should sell the realty in one year from the testator's death
and divide the proceeds and the personalty as directed. The
Court of Chancery of New Jersey holds that two of the testator's children cannot compel a partition of the realty prior
to the time when the power to sell would become operative.
The court says that if the children should be unable to agree
in the time designated the power to sell given to the executors becomes imperative, and in that case the doctrine of
conversion operates and partition is no longer possible.

PLEDGES.

In Meyer Bros. Drug Co. v. Matthews, 64 S. W. 264,
it appeared that a note indorsed to the plaintiff by the payee
Assignment, was pledged by the plaintiff's husband, as her
Conversion agent to the co-defendant, as collateral to a note
given by him to the latter on an express agreement that such
co-defendant would not allow it to go out of his possession. Thereafter, the husband having made what seemed to
be a satisfactory arrangement with this co-defendant, as
to his note, the defendant bought a claim against the plaintiff from the co-defendant the purchase carrying the pledged
note with it, and such sale and delivery of the note being
without notice to the plaintiff. On these facts the Supreme
Court of Arkansas, with one judge dissenting, holds that the
co-defendant having placed it beyond its power to restore
the note, was liable for a conversion thereof, without a payment or tender of the debt.
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RAILROADS.

In New York, N. H. and H. R. Co. v. Book, 49 Atl. 965,
the railroad company brought trespass against a hackman
for remaining on the company's premises to
Hack
Drivers
solicit traffic. The defendant sought to defend
by showing that under an agreement the- company Attempted to give the exclusive privilege of soliciting passengers on the premises to another party, that this exclusive privilege was invalid, and that defendant had as much
right on the premises as such third party. But the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island holds such testimony irrelevant, that
the validity of such an agreement, purporting to give exclusive privileges to a stranger cannot be put irr issue by a
defendant in a suit of this nature.
TROVER.

Where a watch is stolen from one in possession thereof
as a conditional purchaser, a subsequent demand by the
seller for the return of the property on the fallDemand
and
ing due of an instalment of the purchase price,.
Refusal
and the purchaser's failure to deliver, do not
show a conversion: N. Y. Supreme Court (Appellate Division, Second Department) in Sternbergv. Schein, 71 N. Y.
Supp. 511.
VERDICT.

A finding by a jury expressed in the words, "We, the jury,
find for the plaintiff nominal damages, without naming any
amount," is held by the Supreme Court of Geor"Nominal
gia not to be a lawful verdict. Such finding, says
Damages "
the court, is purely relative and carries with it no
suggestion of certainty as to amount, and "a substantial requisite of a verdict is the element of certainty": Sellers v.
Mason, 39 S. E. II.
WILLS.

Where, after the execution of a will devising realty, the
testator subjects it to a mortgage, such mortgage must be
paid from the personalty, leaving the devisee
Devise,
nortgage
the land free from the lien: Supreme Court of
Errors of Connecticut in Jackson v. Bevins, 49 Atl. 899.
Of course, the testator may devise the land subject to the
mortgage, in which case the devisee, accepting it, takes it
subject to the mortgage and must discharge the debt.

